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As the militarized phase of the Syrian Uprising and Civil War 
winds down, questions surrounding how destroyed cities and 
towns will be rebuilt, with what funding and by whom pervade 
the political discourse on Syria. There have been concerns that 
if the international community engages with reconstruction ef-
forts they are legitimizing the regime and its war crimes, leaving 
the regime in a position to control and benefit from reconstruc-
tion. Acting Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, 
Ambassador David Satterfield stated that until a political process 
is in place that ensures the Syrian people are able to choose a 
leadership ‘without Assad at its helm’, then the United States 
will not be funding reconstruction projects.1
The Ambassador of France to the United Nations also stated 
that France will not be taking part in any reconstruction process 
‘unless a political transition is effectively carried out’ and this is 
also the position of the European Union.1 Bashar al-Assad him-
self has outrightly claimed that the West will have no part to play 
                                                     
1 Beals, E (2018). Assad’s Reconstruction Agenda Isn’t Waiting for Peace. 
Neither Should Ours. Available: https://tcf.org/content/report/assads-recon-
struction-agenda-isnt-waiting-peace-neither/?agreed=1. 
1 Irish, J & Bayoumy, Y. (2017). Anti-Assad nations say no to Syria recon-
struction until political process on track. Available: https://uk.reu-
ters.com/article/uk-un-assembly-syria/anti-assad-nations-say-no-to-syria-
reconstruction-until-political-process-on-track-idUKKCN1BU04J.  
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in the reconstruction of Syria.2 Russia has asked for the depolit-
icization of reconstruction efforts in Syria, but if the bulk of the 
efforts are to be led by the Syrian regime, it’s current approach 
to rebuilding destroyed areas does not bode well for a neutral 
“de-politicized” post-conflict reconstruction strategy for the 
country.  
This paper will use two underlying theoretical approaches 
to analyse how the Syrian regime’s approach to reconstruction 
is not merely a result of the civil war, but in fact is tied to a longer 
history of political authoritarianism and the utilization of iden-
tity for political ends which has intersected with urban planning 
practices in the past. The first method is authoritarian upgrading, 
which as described by Steven Heydemann, is the way in which 
a regime will adapt its policies and governance to reflect chang-
ing social, political and economic conditions in an attempt to 
maintain power. The second is sectarianization which recognizes 
the manipulation and weaponization of identity in the Middle 
East and how it is used to stoke fear and generate political loy-
alty.  
By using these two approaches, this paper aims to look at 
how regime-led urban development efforts have and will pro-
duce knock on effects for the demographic makeup of towns and 
cities in Syria. By bringing to light this relationship exposed via 
the various economic and housing laws that have been imple-
mented before and during the civil war, one can see how urban 
development has been politicised and how it solidifies infra-
structural inequalities and reinforces authoritarian rule. This re-
lationship between urban development and political 
authoritarianism is important to understand because it raises con-
cerns for egalitarian and inclusive post-conflict reconstruction 
scenarios that would be led by the Syrian regime – and that are 
already taking place.  
                                                     
2 (2018). ‘We don’t need the West’: Assad to ban foreign money from Syria 
reconstruction. Available: https://www.rt.com/news/430833-syria-ban-west-
ern-investors-assad/. 
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This paper will be split into four sections. Three sections 
separate the Syrian regime’s urban development approaches into 
three time periods. The first section will be a brief scene-setter 
which explores how sectarianized identities interacted with ur-
ban development activity from 1970-2000. The second section, 
from 2000 – 2011, looks at Bashar al-Assad’s ascent and the role 
of economic liberalization in urban development policies. The 
third section will assess 2011 – present day, and the neoliberal 
economic agenda that is driving the creation of luxury housing 
projects and what this means for post-conflict reconstruction ef-
forts. Finally, recommendations will be outlined on how to move 
forward in a post-conflict reconstruction setting in Syria. This 
historical timeline will show that what is novel and should be 
included in analysis of Syria is that these policies of urban de-
velopment that facilitate authoritarianism are not new, they pre-
date the conflict and as a result are likely to become a cycle that 
will repeat itself until addressed.  
Throughout the analysis, examples and case studies will 
come primarily from Damascus and Aleppo. As the two major 
cities in the country, they have dealt with the most rural to urban 
migration, economic development has been focused on these cit-
ies and they have been some of the first cities to receive infra-
structural and developmental support as the conflict started to 
wind down. It is logical to assume they would be the first cities 
to be the focus of the regime’s redevelopment efforts because of 
these conditions, particularly in the areas that have witnessed po-
litical dissent. 
 
 
Authoritarian upgrading and sectarianization as underlying 
theoretical approaches 
 
Authoritarian Upgrading 
With the move towards a more interconnected global society, 
authoritarian upgrading means adapting not just on a national or 
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regional level, but also according to international trends. Steven 
Heydemann explains that regimes are practising a kind of ‘hy-
brid authoritarianism’ where they are keeping old practices of 
‘coercion, surveillance, patronage, corruption and personalism’ 
whilst trying to balance international demands of ‘globalization, 
markets and democratization’.3 Syria’s march towards liberali-
zation particularly under Bashar Al-Assad shows how the state 
recognized the need to adapt its economic policies in particular, 
but unfortunately did not see any benefit in doing the same for 
its political structures.4 As described by Volker Perthes, Syria 
‘disproves the idea that economic and political liberalization go 
hand in hand’.5 This current creation of high-end housing and 
luxury commercial complexes as part of Syria’s reconstruction 
that this paper will analyse further reinforces the fact that the 
Syrian regime is in fact pursuing stricter economic liberalization 
measures whilst retaining repressive political structures. This 
political authoritarianism has been exemplified during the Syr-
ian Civil War with the disappearances, murder and displacement 
of political opposition and an estimated 500,000 of its popula-
tion.6  
 
Sectarianization 
In order for the Syrian state to ‘upgrade’ its authoritarianism it 
needed to secure political loyalties. Sectarianization was the pro-
cess by which the state could, and did, utilize specific commu-
nity concerns to their advantage. Sectarianization itself is a new 
term that moves away from defining identity-based tensions - as 
                                                     
3 Heydemann, S. (2007). Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World. 
Available: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10arab-
world.pdf. p.3 
4 See Haddad, B. (20120). The Syrian Regime’s Business Backbone. 
5 Perthes, V. (1996). Elements and prospects of political change: stages of 
economic and political liberalization. In: Kienle, E Contemporary Syria: Lib-
eralization Between Cold War and Peace. Bloomsbury. p.70. 
6 (2018). Syrian Observatory says war has killed more than half a mil-
lion. Available: https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-7-
years-11-vetoes-500000-dead. 
62    Against all Odds: Intricate Dynamics of Syria’s Reconstruction 
has been done in multi-sectarian societies - as naturally ‘sec-
tarian’, unchanging and inevitable. In this way, sectarianization 
avoids essentializing and solely sectarian-ethnic identity analy-
sis. Sectarianization emphasizes political actors as the main 
driver behind identity-based tensions either increasing or de-
creasing.  
According to Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel who posit 
this idea, these political actors, primarily regimes, do not in fact 
readily control the whole of their population, and as a result re-
sort to manipulation and authoritarianism to dominate, and have 
to continually carry out a process of upgrading in order to main-
tain this control. The state doesn’t hold full control for a variety 
of reasons, and some of these reasons are to do with rural versus 
urban tensions, tribal affiliations, as well as sect, ethnic and 
class-based identities, and particularly during civil wars, infor-
mal and local governances become more trustworthy and relia-
ble than a centralized state apparatus. Regimes make the best of 
such divisions in society to “divide and rule,” to co-opt support-
ers and de-legitimize opponents by playing on identity differ-
ences, notably sectarian cleavages. 
Using the term sectarianization, the starting point is not in 
identity, but in the way that those in power treat pre-existing and 
not necessarily politically-activated identities and modes of self-
organization to ensure the loyalty of their support base and quell 
potential opposition. With this framework of sectarianization, 
class-based identities can also be incorporated into the analysis 
in order to understand how the use of patronage, corruption and 
cronyism, as referenced by Heydemann, impact communities. 
Using the term ‘sectarian’ places class in a separate category to 
sect and ethnic based identities which is not entirely possible in 
the Syrian context as the two intimately interact. 
 
1970 – 2000: rural and urban identities, housing and migration 
With the rural population of Syria accounting for 61.3% of the 
total population in 1960, any political party that was looking to 
assume power in Syria would need to appease this mass, and the 
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Ba’ath Party was no different.7 It is clear that the political actors 
who were vying for power during and after independence in 
Syria saw the importance of appealing to the rural population 
through more egalitarian land policies. They understood how 
important agriculture as well as issues of uneven land distribu-
tion and ownership were to the people of Syria and its economy.8 
With the ascension of the Ba’ath Party came an ideology 
that was based around the socialism of its founders and follow-
ing generations. The ideological beginnings of the Ba’ath Party 
were focused on land redistribution and subsidies, engaging with 
an ‘agrarian radicalism’ intended for the support of the rural 
peasantry in Syria.9 It is also worth noting that the make-up of 
the generation of Ba’athists that implemented these policies 
were primarily of rural and minority origin, and some analysts 
have mentioned this as a factor in their support for early policies 
of land reform. High ranking members of the Ba’ath Military 
Bureau hailed from provincial towns and also minority back-
grounds, rarely graduating beyond high school degree.10 These 
were the people who eventually, through the Ba’ath Party Re-
gional Command Military Bureau, led the 1970s coup that saw 
the rise of Hafez al-Assad as President of Syria. But this link 
between rural/urban identities and land has existed since before 
Syria’s independence. The French Mandate period left a legacy 
of spatial segregation based on sect and ethnicity, with what has 
been described as an ‘active sympathy towards rural popula-
tions’ particularly in Alawi and Jabal Druze areas.11 Here rural 
and ethnic identities were intertwined and made inseparable 
from spatial arrangements.  
                                                     
7 Batatu, H (1999). Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural 
Notables, and Their Politics. Princeton University Press. p.6 
8 Azmeh, S. (2011). The Uprising of the Marginalized: A Socio-Economic 
Perspective of the Syrian Uprising. Available: https://core.ac.uk/down-
load/pdf/35433799.pdf. p.6 
9 Haddad, B (2011). Business Networks in Syria The Political Economy of 
Authoritarian Resilience. Stanford University Press. P.49. 
10 Batatu, H. Syria’s Peasantry. p.37 
11 Ibid, p.156 
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It was well documented that the mid-sixties and early 1970s 
saw power initially shift into the ‘geographically peripheral, so-
cially ascending and ethnically minoritarian sectors of society’.12 
The popularity of the Ba’ath party by those ‘geographically pe-
ripheral’ citizens can also be seen in the make-up of the Ba’ath 
Party membership in 1979. The largest population of members 
came from smaller towns and cities such as Homs, (4,332) Hama 
(4,753), Tartus (4,530) and Latakia (3,691), and again in 1992 
these areas had the largest memberships with Homs at 20,882 
members, Latakia at 19,635, Tartus at 19,669 and Damascus at 
13,779.13 At the same time, Volker Perthes described the devel-
opment strategy of the 1970s as ‘inegalitarian’, fostering an ‘en-
riched stratum… which included some higher echelons of the 
bureaucracy, the party, and the military as well as new commer-
cial bourgeoisie who owed their status to the business ties to the 
state’.14 From this we can ascertain that there was a mix of class-
based but also minority ethnic and sect based support mobilized 
by the state, a strategy of domestic-alliance building that has 
been followed to this day.  
The rural population began to decline with increasing mi-
gration to urban centres due to state expansion of civil, military 
and intelligence branches opening up public sector employment. 
There was a slow decline in the rural population of Syria from 
the 61.3% of the 1960 census to 56.5% in 1970, 52.9% in 1981, 
and then 48.6% in 1994.15 Looking at Aleppo, since the French 
Mandate period, the old city and the West of Aleppo were the 
                                                     
12 Bahout, J.(1996). The Syrian business community, its politics and pro-
spects. The Syrian Business Community . In: Kienle, E Contemporary 
Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War and Peace. l: Bloomsbury. p.76. 
13 Batatu, H. Syria’s Peasantry. p.181 
14 Perthes, V. Elements and prospects of political change. p.54 
15 Batatu, H. Syria’s Peasantry, p.5-6. This should read with the recognition 
that women working on family farms weren’t included in these figures and 
neither were Bedouins.in these figures and neither were Bedouins  
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traditional hubs of the city. These areas housed the central mar-
kets and the political bureaucracy such as the regional headquar-
ters of state institutions. This continued during Bashar al-
Assad’s period where to this day security agencies and the mili-
tary apparatus as well as the mayor’s offices, the university and 
hospitals are found in the West.16 However, the 1950s and 1960s 
saw an expansion of the city to the East which, as a result, be-
came home to newer migrants. Jean Claude Davide, a colleague 
of the architects responsible for Aleppo’s urban re-development 
Michel Ecochard and Gyoji Banshoya, highlighted this East-
West separation when he wrote of the modern bourgeoisie con-
sisting of mostly Sunni but also Christians residing in the West 
alongside most of the ‘state and regime infrastructure’ such as 
the Artillery Base, Military Intelligence, Military Academy, Air 
Defence Base as well as the water tanks of the city. In contrast, 
the Eastern neighbourhoods were, and still are, home to small 
mosques and schools as well as more informal markets.17 The 
1974 urbanization plan for Aleppo was an attempt at moderniza-
tion that expanded the city’s centre and connected the old city to 
newer developments via new roads.18 This plan shows the state’s 
attempt to respond to urban migration and economic growth, but 
with it we see the perpetuation of the segregation of East and 
West Aleppo. Resources were provided to the West of the city, 
and the continued embourgeoisement of Western Aleppo took 
place.19 During the early 1990s there was a partial process of 
                                                     
16 Khaddour, K. (2017). Consumed by War: The End of Aleppo and North-
ern Syria’s Political Order . Available: http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/13783.pdf. p.5 
17 Davide, J. (2016). Comment L'histoire explicque l'actualité D'Alep. Quelles 
raisons historiques peuvent-elles expliquer que la ville soit un enjeu 
aujourd'hui?. Available: https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Comment-
l-histoire-explique-l-actualite-d-Alep-Partie-2-Quelles-raisons.html. 
18 UNESCO. (1980). The Conservation of the old city of Aleppo: Syrian Arab 
Republic. Available: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000042161. 
p.35 
19 Davide, J. (2016). Comment L'histoire explicque l'actualité D'Alep. 
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economic liberalization, but only 17.6% of the private invest-
ment opportunities being distributed by the state were afforded 
to Aleppo as opposed to the 50% being given to Damascus.20 
This eventually improved towards the end of the 1990s and early 
2000s, showing that the regime recognized the need to secure the 
loyalty of the Aleppine urban business class. Although it is not 
as clear cut as this, general trends show that there was an inter-
dependency between East and West Aleppo along economic 
lines. Those in the West were owners of businesses and the East-
ern residents were blue-collar workers providing the workforce. 
The divisions of the city of Aleppo were and continue to be more 
along the lines of class as opposed to sect or ethnicity, and one 
even sees these fault lines drawn out in the destruction of the city 
in the 2016 battle for Aleppo. 
A similar process of migration of newer urban dwellers was 
also taking place in Damascus. The population jumped from 
529,963 in 1960 to 836,668 in 1970, and by 1981 the population 
was at 1,112,214. Sami al-Jundi, the Ba’ath Minister of Infor-
mation after the 1963 Syrian coup, claimed that ‘caravans of vil-
lagers began moving from the plains and mountains towards 
Damascus, and the perturbing qaf soon dominated its streets and 
coffeehouses, and the waiting rooms in government offices’.21 
Here, al-Jundi is referencing the use of the letter qaf in the Ara-
bic language, which is not a trait of the colloquial Arabic of 
Damascenes, showing that there was a large enough migration 
of non-Damascenes into the city to recognize these linguistic dif-
ferences and subsequently a demographic change in the capital. 
The map below - from Masanori Naito’s 1982 paper on the urban 
development of Damascus - shows how the city expanded be-
tween 1945 and 1983, corroborating the census data. As is 
shown from this graph, areas such as Barzeh, Qaboun, Jobar, 
Midan, and Kafr Sousseh were newer developments from 1983 
                                                     
20 Khaddour, K. Consumed by War. p.9 
21 Batatu, H. Syria’s Peasantry. p.160 
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onwards, and as will be discussed in the second part of this pa-
per, these areas witnessed intense violence and destruction dur-
ing the civil war.  
After the 1970s, and as it implemented more economically 
liberal policies, the regime recognized the need to transform its 
political base. The alliance between the state apparatus and the 
business class facilitated stability for the regime.22 The state 
needed to attract a base beyond the rural peasantry, small town 
citizens and minority groups, and as a result this meant engaging 
with those communities that had been side-lined initially or that 
there had been previous tensions with, for example, the urban 
and predominantly Sunni business class of the cities. More em-
phasis was placed on securing economic growth and developing 
networks based on class, and one can see the beginnings of a 
move away from their original constituencies of support, defin-
ing their political base more along the lines of an urban identity, 
                                                     
22 Hinnebusch, R. (1997). Debates on Syrian Political Economy under the 
Ba’ath. In: Perthes, V. The Political Economy of Syria Under Asad. p.2 
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particularly amongst the newer generation of Syrians that are 
only now in positions of influence in the Syrian business world.  
Indeed, many of these new businessmen are the children of the 
political elite. 
Syria’s independent origins still retained remnants of colo-
nial identity-based divisions, and with a Ba’ath Party who were 
ideologically fixated on economic redistribution, it was inevita-
ble that identity would continue to play a role in Syrian society. 
With increased migration flows into the larger urban cities like 
Damascus and Aleppo, the rural and urban classes had begun to 
interact and the state had to learn how to balance support for their 
original rural loyalists and the urban business class who they 
would need to appease to ensure stable economic liberalization 
while still retaining political control.  
 
2000-2011, Syria’s housing crisis, economy and pre-war regeneration 
The beginning of the 21st century was a turning point for Syria’s 
economy. As the country was aligning more with global prac-
tices in the Western world, there was a sense that a new era was 
arriving in Syria and even a level of hope for political reforms. 
Activists in Damascus were engaging with the new President, 
Bashar al-Assad, who was tentatively showing willingness to 
their demands of multiparty democracy, release of political pris-
oners and economic rights to all citizens.23  Unfortunately this 
optimism was short lived and as discussed below, despite devel-
opments in privatizing the economy and stimulating growth that 
emerged with Bashar Al Assad, the demands that came with a 
steady urbanization rate – one of those being the need for more 
housing - still remained a serious problem for the country.  
In 2005, via the government’s General Establishment for 
Housing, it was reported that 13,500 people signed up to a hous-
ing scheme in Damascus that was building only 410 flats in the 
city, and 70,000 young people enrolled in a youth housing 
                                                     
23 (2012). The Damascus Spring. Available: http://carnegie-mec.org/di-
wan/48516?lang=en.  
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scheme that was only intended for 10,000.24 A United Nations’ 
Habitat report of 2006 stated that Syria was facing a demand of 
120 thousand flats per year.25 The need for housing was outstrip-
ping state capacity to build new accommodation, and increased 
urbanization to the capital city and other major cities wasn’t 
making the situation any easier. Between 2003 and 2004, 1.2 – 
1.5 million residents moved from rural areas to urban centres.26 
In 2007, it was expected that the rate of urbanization would go 
from 51% to 61% in the next 25 years, and municipal develop-
ment was suggesting that the urban population of Syria would 
shoot up from 12.1 million in 2010 to 18.3 million in 2025.27 
This is Syria’s urban development-based context in the early 
2000s. This section will document the period of the 21st century 
before the civil war, looking at how privatization and informal 
housing were two important thematic strands to understand in 
the country, and can help us to understand how – whether inten-
tionally or not - the foundations were set for further identity-
based migration and demographic re-organization in Damascus 
in particular. 
 
Privatization and regeneration strategies 
Before the civil war there was an increase in the planning of lux-
ury housing and commercial projects in Damascus, as well as 
attempts to redevelop informal housing. Although many of these 
projects did not reach completion, they express a vision for Da-
mascus in particular and the direction Syrian society as a whole 
                                                     
24 Goulden, R. (2011) Housing, Inequality, and Economic Change in 
Syria, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, p.199 
25 Laue, F. (2012). Vertical Versus Horizontal: Constraints of Modern Liv-
ing Conditions in Informal Settlements and the Reality of Construction. In: 
Ababsa, M. and Baudouin, D. and Dennis, E. Popular Housing and Urban 
Land Tenure in the Middle East: Case Studies from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Turkey. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. p.112. 
26 Conduit, D. (2017) The Patterns of Syrian Uprising: Comparing Hama in 
1980–1982 and Homs in 2011, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 
p.83 
27 Laue, F. Vertical Versus Horizontal. p.112 
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was headed in. This vision was one that intended to raise the so-
cial status of the major cities and evidence suggests this was at 
the expense of poorer communities. 
Housing strategies reflected the broader development strat-
egy pursued especially after 2000, shaped by neo-liberalism and 
associated moves toward privatization. Privatization in Syria 
during the early 2000s blurred the line between state and private 
sector ownership. Those businesspeople that were engaging in 
this joint state-private sector activity were empowered through 
the new economic strategy of 2005 which was announced at the 
10th Regional Command Conference. Syria’s 10th five-year plan 
of 2005 recognized the need for economic reform in light of both 
domestic and foreign policy concerns such as decreasing oil re-
serves, and so presented a form of social market economy that 
would guide Syria moving forward.28 These informal business 
networks were, and continue to be, the backbone of Syria’s 
march towards economic liberalization in the early twenty-first 
century, contributing towards large wealth disparities which are 
most striking through the new buildings projects of Damascus 
that will be explored further on in this paper. Individuals such as 
Rami Makhlouf, Muhammad Hamsho and Jamal Abdulkarim – 
all now, coincidentally, facing economic sanctions by the US 
government for their involvement in the war economy and prof-
iteering from the Syrian civil war - represent this business class 
that blurred the lines, and the kinds of benefits afforded to family 
and friends close to the state. 
The Damascus Cham Holding Company was one such ex-
ample of how businesses were empowered through these new 
economic policies. The Damascus Cham Holding Company – 
supported by President Bashar al-Assad - was set up in 2015 and 
held a capital of $279 million dollars.29 While the state held a 
                                                     
28 Haddad, B. The Political Economy of Syria: Realities and Chal-
lenges. Available: https://www.mepc.org/political-economy-syria-realities-
and-challenges. 
29 Khaddour, K. (2017). I, the Supreme. Available: https://carnegie-
mec.org/diwan/68348. 
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share, it also brought together 70 of Syria’s largest businessmen, 
with the majority shareholder being Rami Makhlouf who also 
owned more than half of the company.30 These public-private 
enterprises were important because they reinforced those very 
informal networks that had already monopolized Syria’s grow-
ing private sector since the 1980s. 
Public-private enterprises or partnerships (PPP), also 
known as ‘mixed sector companies’ were encouraged through 
Law No. 10 of 1991. This law enabled the state to remain a ‘si-
lent partner’ in a company but still hold a minimum of 25% of 
the shares. Individual private shareholders who wished to be part 
of a mixed company were not permitted to hold more than 5% 
of the equity capital.31 There was clearly an opening up of the 
private sector in Syria through Law No. 10 but it was only an 
economic opening amidst the backdrop of a state concerned with 
trying to hold onto control through political authoritarianism. 
Between 2007 and 2010, there were a number of real estate pro-
jects started in Damascus that were examples of these public-
private partnerships (PPPs) such as the Garden City Resorts, 
Eighth Gate and Bonyan City. They attracted up to $20 billion 
of investment.32 Damascus Hills is another project that was in 
the design phase before the civil war began in 2011 with the goal 
of building 7,500 residential units that would house up to 30,000 
people, offering a ‘21st century mountain resort lifestyle’.33 The 
project had to be put on hold as it was being built in the suburbs 
of Damascus that were to see intense violence and conflict dur-
ing the civil war. Damascus Hills had been criticised for its fail-
ure to actually address the housing crisis that Syria was facing, 
and instead was being used as an opportunity to generate income 
                                                     
30 Azmeh, S. The Uprising of the Marginalized. p.14 
31 Polling, S.(1996). The Crisis of 1986 and Syria's Plan for Reform. In: 
Kienle, E Contemporary Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War and 
Peace. l: Bloomsbury. p.15 
32 Goulden, R. Housing, Inequality, and Economic Change in Syria. p.191 
33 Damascus Hill, Syria. Available: http://www.matrixpartnership.co.uk/da-
mascus-hills--syria.html. 
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for the government and its private partners from the more well 
off parts of society. 34 It is not explicit but it is clear that these 
houses would only be available to a certain class of Syrian that 
would be able to afford to spend in the restaurants, resorts and 
rented offices of these complexes.  
Historically and from a European context, these kinds of 
suburbs of a city were understood as areas where the well-to-do 
would move to in order to avoid the dirt and toil of the inner city. 
Brook, Mooney and Pile explain how the suburbs were an at-
tempt at ‘de-intensifying urban social relations’ for those that 
could afford to do so. Suburbs are seen as ‘stable’, and a ‘ho-
mogenous community’ with a ‘moral landscape’. In the Middle 
East, Mona Fawaz and Najib Hourani discuss their respective 
cities, Beirut and Amman, and how urban social relations inter-
act in these specific Middle Eastern contexts. Hourani writes of 
the Arab city as consisting of ‘differential spaces and fragments 
that… reflects a wedding of oligarchic power and persistent co-
lonial ontologies’. With Amman, he highlights the link between 
neoliberalism, the contemporary Jordanian economic reality and 
a geographical politics of inclusion and exclusion in the city. In 
Neoliberal Urbanity, and the Right to the City: A View from Bei-
rut’s Periphery, Mona Fawaz (2009) tries to understand the de-
mographic composition of Beirut in light of neoliberal economic 
policies and a legacy of violent civil war. She pays particular 
attention to the role of informal housing in the city and these 
alternative networks created in ‘slums’, and how a whole world 
of political and economic relations exists outside of the state. 
This understanding looks at the perspective of the dweller of in-
formal housing and their way of organizing within such a struc-
ture. that alienates residents through processes of inclusion and 
exclusion. These informal housing residents have no choice but 
to create alternative networks of welfare and housing support in 
the absence of the state which has neglected them. This example 
                                                     
34 Urban Housing and the Question of Property Rights in Syria.Available: 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bra99ucA6ElPQVj6p-
wVlVxXdjThWh4B/view. p.33 
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in Beirut shows the negative effects of neoliberal economic pol-
icies and their relation to urban housing but also shows the op-
portunity for these disadvantaged residents to self-organize and 
create pockets of local social support systems. This creation of 
alternative networks - occuring through the inclusion and exclu-
sion of communities as gentrification and neoliberal urban pol-
icy – facilitated the ‘restructuring of the social composition of 
Beirut’. The projects started in Damascus add to the examples of 
how freer market economies tied to the development of upper 
class housing complexes are part of a larger phenomenon across 
the Middle East as well as globally in developing countries, but 
also of how these negative overarching socio-economic struc-
tures encourage potential prospects for local, specific and mean-
ingful social support systems started by the residents themselves. 
. 35 
In Syria more specifically, this concept of inclusion and ex-
clusion, and the right to the city is also explored by both Fabrice 
Balanche and Salwa Ismail. Balanche once described Damascus 
as a city of ‘anti-insurgency urban planning’.36 Whilst Salwa Is-
mail wrote of the geographical layout of Damascus and how it 
acts as a physical impediment to protestors and general large-
scale disobedience. Ismail gives the example of the Ummayyad 
Square in the centre of Damascus and how it is ‘fortified from 
all directions’. There are republican guards stationed all around 
the area, the air force headquarters is located nearby as is the 
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chief of staff offices of the army, political police and state secu-
rity.37 It is near enough impossible to physically demonstrate dis-
content and politically organize in Damascus outside of the 
purview of the state. The layout of urban centres is very im-
portant to solidifying control in any area, and one can see that 
the areas of Damascus that are now undergoing redevelopment 
are areas close to centres of power, for example embassies of 
allies, and airports. 
This trend of globalised neoliberal economic activity that 
manifests through housing and urban structures is particularly 
evident in the level of collaborative effort expended by the inter-
national community in the design and implementation of these 
projects in post-conflict Syria. The design process for Damascus 
Hills was facilitated by a British company, Matrix Partnership, 
and the funding was provided by a Dubai-based real estate com-
pany Emaar Partnerships who were funnelling $4 billion into the 
project before the Uprising.38 In these plans, luxury communi-
ties, gated communities and even luxury-gated communities 
were being built not as primary housing for the average Syrian 
family but as secondary homes for those that wish to leave the 
city for the summer or to just relocate temporarily. Those with 
economic privilege could distinguish and separate their geogra-
phies and histories from their perceived other. These complexes 
are filled not only with residential houses but offices, malls and 
gardens to create mini cities that in a way create the opposite of 
a ‘shadow state’ of informal housing settlements that were built 
up around Aleppo and Damascus in particular.39 These new 
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mini-cities are the strategic vision for future Syrian cities in the 
reconstruction era.  
 
Informal housing  
As these new complexes mentioned above were in the pipeline 
in the early 2000s, laws were being put in place to redevelop and 
legalize informal housing. Housing was not affordable for all 
and with 1/3 of the urban population living in informal settle-
ments before the war, this was a crisis that the state could not 
solve alone. Laws were put in place to encourage the private sec-
tor to take up some of the burden while ensuring the activity still 
remained under state control.40 
Ashwaiyat or informal housing/random zones as they are 
termed have been in Syria since the 1960s.41 Despite informal 
housing not being officially registered with the authorities, a 
blind eye had been turned to their development and there was a 
tacit understanding of a need for more affordable and wide-
spread housing to accommodate the influx of rural migrants into 
major cities. With a Kuwaiti Financial Centre report claiming 
that house prices in Damascus were ‘rivalling European capitals’ 
in the early 2000s, economic migrants did not have many other 
choices aside from adapting and thus building informal hous-
ing.42 
There were a number of laws established with the aim of 
solving the rapid development of informal housing such as De-
cree 96 of 1974 which was an attempt to establish cooperative 
housing.43 Law No. 60 of 1979 was another attempt to ‘take care’ 
of urban expansion and prevent informal settlements that were 
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being built without state permission. The law itself enabled mu-
nicipal and regional councils to confiscate land as they pleased 
to prepare for a five-year urban plan.44 There was an amendment 
of Law 60 through Law No. 26 of 2000 which tried to limit this 
abusive confiscation, but to what extent this pacified informal 
patronage networks is unclear.45 With these laws the state be-
came the ‘natural protector of eminent domain’, meaning a state 
is able to take private property and publicly use it so long as the 
state provides compensation to the private owner.46 In this way 
confiscations were legalized. The state was taking control of and 
preventing illegal housing being built, but the public housing 
projects that were being implemented instead were poorly man-
aged, and the public and private landowners that did take control 
of these areas didn’t have the money to develop them properly.47  
The informal housing crisis before Bashar al-Assad came to 
power was treated in such an ad-hoc way that it was always seen 
as a case-by-case problem, and never a deep-rooted systemic is-
sue that required a consistent institutional response. This does 
not mean it wasn’t politicised, rather it just wasn’t treated as a 
political priority by the state. Despite laws being passed, it is 
important to note that there is also a clear discrepancy between 
laws in theory and laws being actualized. The discussion and 
analysis of these laws can and should also be used as a way to 
understand the general narrative and vision the state thought of 
implementing in addition to looking at what the laws meant on 
the ground.  
There were many inconsistent laws implemented by the 
Syrian regime from the year 2000 onwards that can help us to 
unpack the authoritarian approach to housing in the country, de-
spite the inclusion of the private sector in building activity. For 
example, Law 1 of 2003 was implemented to provide a stricter 
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approach to illegal housing being built in existing planning ar-
eas, with larger fines put in place and even jail sentences for 
those who were building.48 A year later, Law 46 of 2004 led to 
the legalization of a lot of informal housing and made it a re-
quirement for authorities to provide services to its residents.49 
The regime had realised that it wouldn’t be financially beneficial 
to destroy the settlements after private companies had put money 
into building them and instead facilitated their legalisation. The 
regime was only accepting of informal settlements if they were 
under state control or regulated by them. By 2006, the regime’s 
5 year plan included efforts to outsource and replace informal 
housing, with the aim of 77% of new formal housing being pro-
vided privately.50 At that time, informal housing was officially 
neither registered as state nor privately property, but rested in a 
state of limbo. It appears that the intention was for the private 
sector to be involved in large housing schemes to replace the 
production of informal housing. The illegal settlement situation 
in Syria was such a problem problematic that in a United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) report of 2006 they were de-
scribed as ‘time bombs which could detonate at any moment’.51 
Informal housing was underfunded and neglected by the state. 
This UNDP quote above shows that grievances  around living 
conditions and welfare support for the less wealthy social classes 
had the potential to boil over beyond just individual complaints 
and turn into some organized form of conflict or demonstration 
of discontent.   
What were these grievances? On the one hand, Law 33 of 
2008 aimed to give property rights to those who lived in informal 
settlements but for a fee. While at the same time the state imple-
mented Law 59 of 2008 which took a tougher stance on informal 
housing, ordering its demolition and the eviction of squatters.52 
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Law 33 is an individualistic attempt to resolve the problem of 
informal housing without taking into account the systemic root 
of the problem which is that increased urbanization was and con-
tinues to pose a risk because of the lack of resources being put 
into the primary housing needs of the population. Law 33 mani-
fests how far Syria was ‘further entrenching market forms of re-
lations in everyday practices’, a definition of neoliberalism as 
used by Mona Fawaz, Professor of Urban Planning.53 As well as 
the economic criticisms of this property titling approach (Robert 
Goulden discusses in further detail), this process of legalization 
with a fee was being forced onto people who did not have a 
choice but to create informal housing that went through incon-
sistent policies of either being ignored, legalized, criminalized, 
confiscated and as the civil war progressed, was in some in-
stances demolished. 
Another example of state failure to recognize the nation-
wide, deep-rooted and institutional problem of informal settle-
ments can be found in Aleppo. In 2009 a report was issued by 
the German company GIZ and the Municipality of Aleppo which 
had created their own informal housing unit. This report was 
done to trace all the informal housing settlements in Aleppo, 
looking at ‘conditions, problems and opportunities’ for policy 
makers and officials to take into consideration via short profiles 
of the 28 informal settlements of Aleppo.54 The profiles are de-
politicized and fail to mention the causes of problems such as 
poverty, high levels of crime and drug use. A report that fails to 
assume responsibility for dilapidated informal housing and is-
sues of poverty and crime, fails to understand the relationship 
between housing grievances and political opposition and insta-
bility, which can lead to the ‘time bombs’ described in the 2006 
UNDP report. 
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Aleppo has a history of urban development that saw the ex-
pansion of the city to the East in the 50s and 60s hence an in-
creased growth of informal settlements. As these settlements 
were comprised of migrants, there was a tendency for them to 
align more with the villages that they came from and the outer 
Aleppo area, as opposed to the city of Aleppo itself. As a result, 
these residents brought with them their own set of social struc-
tures.55 Areas such as Masakin Hanano held migrants from 
Manbij in the East. Shaykh Maqsoud and Al Ashrafiyya were 
home to Syrians from Afrin, and Al Sha’ar and Bab al Neirab 
host migrants from the Eastern Aleppo countryside. There were 
also migrants from Idlib that settled in Saif al Dawlah, Salahed-
dine and Masakin Hanano, and so there is no doubt that their 
traditions, social networks and affiliations were brought with 
them.56 It was documented that an industrialist in Aleppo be-
lieved his ‘secret’ to success was that he never trusted and did 
not give positions of responsibility to people who lived in infor-
mal housing zones, and only depended on his family and those 
in his own social network.57 In Aleppo, those residents from the 
East were seen as ‘poverty stricken, crime-ridden and violent’ 
and there was even too great a ‘cultural distance’ for marriages 
to take place between West and East Aleppans.58 With informal 
housing in Aleppo comprising more than 30% of the total hous-
ing, the informal infrastructure has been described by one Syrian 
architect as creating a ‘parallel and shadow urban city system’.59 
This is a dangerous development that can only be exacerbated 
by continued neglect and ghettoization. Parts of the city are seen 
as ‘good or bad, clean or dirty, safe or dangerous’ where indi-
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viduals are identified and labelled according to their neighbour-
hood.60 These misconceptions of the other are prevalent across 
societies but for it to be so stark in one city with similar sect and 
ethnic structure, with the only real difference being the class fac-
tor, shows that sect-based analyses do not do this city in partic-
ular any justice. It is important to note that there are certain areas 
that don’t fit this informal/formal housing binary such as 
Jama’iat Zahra and Halab Al Jadideh which were built by private 
investors in the 1990s. These areas contain a mix of residents 
from the West of Aleppo but also Eastern residents who moved 
up the social ladder and could afford more modern homes sur-
rounded by commercial shopping areas and public gardens.61  
In Damascus, between 1981 – 1994, 65% of new housing 
needs were met through informal areas.62 With the intensifica-
tion of migration from the coastal areas in the 70s and 80s, new 
informal settlements had to be built. Mezze 86 was one of these 
settlements that emerged and homed members of Rifa’at al 
Asad’s 86 division which consisted of low level army volun-
teers. The area was said to be about 85% Alawite at that time.63 
Qaboun is another informal settlement in Damascus that saw a 
large migration of workers from northern Syria around rural 
Idlib and is part of the later wave of development in Damascus 
as per Masanori Naito’s map shown earlier. Grievances existed 
in Damascus as well, where certain settlements received more 
benefits than others. For example, there was subsidized housing 
for officer corps in areas of Damascus such as Mezzeh 86. Mus-
tafa Tlass, a previous Defense Minister said those military offic-
ers who took up housing via the military housing establishment 
only had to pay between 46,000 and 64,000 Syrian pounds for 
houses in Damascus that were worth as much as 170,000 to 
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200,000 Syrian pounds.64 Proximity to the state and levels of 
state loyalty played an important role in the quality of housing 
that was received, and clear benefits were given to certain com-
munities that contributed to uneven development, and ultimately 
the state securing political loyalties.  
Until the civil war actually began, there was no systemic 
destruction and regeneration of areas in an attempt to quell op-
position, rather it was an attempt to boost Syria’s status in the 
world and as described by former Economics Minister, Abdullah 
Al-Dardari, Syria was trying to aspire towards being a ‘middle 
to upper income society which with the onset of the war, was no 
longer a possibility.65 The historical contextualization of both 
Damascus and Aleppo’s urban development reinforces the way 
in which informal housing and urban development more gener-
ally interacted with political authoritarianism and loyalties that 
revolved around identities in the country. The sentiments of 
those citizens of Aleppo mentioned above still persist to this day 
and if informal housing is not treated as a priority issue and hous-
ing is made affordable and available to all citizens regardless of 
political loyalty or identity-based affiliations, this will continue 
even into post-conflict reconstruction efforts. 
 
2011 – present: civil war and redevelopment  
In Spring 2011 it was reported that all European experts had left 
the country and international financiers and corporations in-
volved in construction projects had mostly left too. 66 Despite 
this, there were attempts to continue the construction of informal 
settlements and carry on real estate projects to emphasise the fact 
that Syria as a whole was still carrying out ‘business as usual’, 
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but it was clear that large scale demolitions and destruction of 
Syria’s infrastructure was taking place.  
It has been recognised that the general destruction in the 
country was used as a way to erase unruly populations and I 
would argue re-write geographies67. Clear patterns emerged 
from the destruction efforts and one was the focus on targeting 
informal housing where opposition to the regime had become 
concentrated. The website Syria Tracker traced the total deaths 
of Syrians by geography, documenting both regime and opposi-
tion group killings. By December 2012, more than half of all 
deaths in Aleppo took place in only 15 out of 56 neighbourhoods 
of the city, and in Damascus, 65% of all deaths took place in 
only 7 neighbourhoods. In Aleppo these were Salah ad-Din, Al-
Sukkary, Bustan al-Qasr, al-Sha’ar, al-Firdos, Masaken Hanano, 
Al-Haydariyah, Sakhour, Tariq Al-Bab, Marjeh, Qadi Askar, 
Sayf al-Dawla, Karm al-Jabal, Bustan al-Basha and al-Amriyah. 
In Damascus the areas were Qaboun, Jobar, Hajar al-Aswad, 
Qadam, Tadamon, Yarmouk and Sayyida Zeinab - the majority 
of these being informal settlements.68 It is clear that informal ar-
eas are viewed as a threat to the regime and have come to sym-
bolize political opposition. The discussion in this paper is 
concerned with the more targeted demolitions particularly in the 
suburbs of Damascus that tie together the narrative above of a 
new vision for Syria that rests on a wealthier and more obedient 
population.  
Decree 66 of 2012 was one of the most infamous contem-
porary laws that continued the regime’s process of demolition 
and re-development in Damascus. It has been criticised as an at-
tempt to erase political opposition under the guise of informal - 
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which is now more stringently synonymous with illegal - hous-
ing. Decree 66 focused on ‘organizing irregular areas and infor-
mal housing’ in two zones of Damascus: the South East area of 
Mezzeh and Kafr Sousseh, and the Southern area of Darayya and 
Qadam.69 So far, this organization of irregular areas has mani-
fested in destroying old residences and replacing them with up-
graded luxury housing. The idea was to start in Damascus and if 
successful branch out to other cities such as Aleppo. As early as 
2010 this kind of project was being planned for the Northern city 
of Homs. The Homs Dream Project saw the demolition of infor-
mal housing in the East of the city for another luxury complex.70 
Eastern Homs and these informal areas were sites of intense vi-
olence and confrontation during the beginning of the civil war. 
These plans were clearly part of a vision for Syria that pre-dated 
the civil war, tied to a strategy of wanting to regenerate more run 
down and poorer areas of the country, but they were exacerbated 
and even justified in the regime’s point of view when citizens 
decided to politicize their social situation. The targeted areas 
destined for reconstruction have raised concerns that this is an 
attempt to solidify authoritarian rule by engineering demo-
graphic change in the city.71 
In Damascus, one of the projects cuts through the area of 
Mezzeh. Mezzeh is split between the loyalist citizens of Mezzeh 
86 who moved to the area in the 1970s, particularly from the 
Assad homeland of Latakia, and Mezzeh Basateen which is 
home to more working-class majority Sunni residents. The site 
that faced targeted demolition in 2012 was the area of Mezzeh 
Basateen near Al-Razi Hospital. It is around 2.15 million square 
metres of land and redevelopment efforts were taking place close 
to the Iranian Embassy and Mezzeh Military Airport.72 As men-
tioned previously, Damascus has the air of a fortified city, and 
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political opposition in areas so close to the Iranian Embassy and 
an airport are a risk for the regime. The project which intends to 
create a new city/complex called Marota City, meaning ‘sover-
eignty/homeland’ in ancient Syriac, aims to build 12,000 hous-
ing units for approximately 60,000 residents. This mini city 
razed an entire area to the ground as is shown in the satellite 
imagery below. The use of Ancient Syriac as opposed to Arabic 
to name the city also attempts to build a cultural narrative that 
goes back in time, beyond Arab nationalism and Ottoman con-
quests, and that pulls on a deeper historical tradition aiming to 
unite citizens or rebuild a new Syrian identity, and as a result 
erasing more contemporary political antagonisms. 
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[Human Rights Watch satellite imagery showing demolition of 
Mezze in 2012] 
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Marota City aims to have schools, restaurants, mosques, a 
car park, a shopping mall and at least three 50-floor skyscrapers. 
The original inhabitants of this Mezzeh Basateen area are people 
from rural and low-income backgrounds, and from as early as 
2009, residents were worried about the state wanting to demolish 
their homes.73 This project didn’t officially receive funding until 
2015 through legislative Decree 19, but fears of demolition from 
poorer residents was an existential threat pre-civil war.  
The Basilia Project is another example of a mini-city in-
tended to be built near the Marota City complex in South/South 
Western Damascus. But it is still feeding into the same concerns 
as Marota City. One resident in a local newspaper states: 
 
“The problem is that there is no clear vision of the solution. They 
said there is an [sic] alternative housing, and we will not go out 
before it is secured, but so far, the alternative housing has not 
been secured and the rent is very high in the capital. “74 
 
Another resident mentions people selling the shares of the prop-
erties they own and moving to more affordable neighbourhoods 
such as Qatana and Jdeidah Artuz.75  
 
A resident of Qaboun also comments: 
 
“We think the regime will convert the neighbourhood, after its 
reconstruction, into a military zone, or something resembling the 
loyalist neighbourhoods in Damascus and on its fringes, along 
the lines of al Mazze 86, al Tadhamun and al Sumeriyya…How 
are we to return to live in our neighbourhood if its demographic 
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makeup has changed? Perhaps we’ll be accused of sectarianism, 
but let’s call it like it is: none of al Qaboun’s residents is [sic] 
going to return to live side by side with those who had a hand in 
their murder and displacement”76 
 
Today, Qaboun is part of the area designated to be re-devel-
oped under Law No. 10 of 2018.77 Qaboun witnessed an intense 
military offensive in 2017 by the regime to regain control, and 
as documented by Human Rights Watch the regime is destroying 
houses without warning and preventing the return of displaced 
people.78 The regime is allowing entry back into Qaboun in an 
arbitrary manner. Human Rights Watch also reports that even 
those neighbourhoods that one can enter have both physical and 
financial restrictions on entering and leaving. For example, one 
must pay 500 Syrian pounds to leave the area to go to central 
Damascus and they must return the same day, they also must 
leave their identification cards at a checkpoint on the way 
there.79 This erratic state protocol strengthens feelings of mis-
trust between the population and the state, raising concerns as to 
whether these laws that aim to regenerate towns are actually 
working in favour of the people or are just the solidification of a 
regime-centred vision for Syrian society.  
Law No. 10 of 2018 decrees that any illegal or unregistered 
properties are to be demolished or returned to the state unless 
official documentation is provided by residents within 30 days 
to prove their ownership. After continued international pressure, 
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residents have now been given up to a year to prove ownership.80 
Only 9% of refugees were reported as having property title deeds 
with them in a 2017 UNHCR/Norwegian Refugee Council re-
port.81 There were no considerations or caveats put in place for 
those who are no longer in the country, or those who were killed 
and have no documentation to prove their death and identity. 
Law No. 10 further intensifies the mistrust that exists 
amongst the Syrian population, particularly those from poorer 
backgrounds who are residents of informal housing and who 
have been living undocumented and relatively undisturbed lives 
until the civil war began. In Darayya, a woman who tried to re-
turn to her home was not allowed to by the regime. She was not 
even allowed to visit her properties and no reason was given as 
to why. Her response was:  
 
“Some people will get an approval. Others won’t,” she said. 
“Hopefully, our name gets on the list and they let us back. We 
didn’t get any promises. We’re just hoping.” 
 
This is a continuation of the climate of fear that existed pre-war, 
and the insistence on not asking any further questions to avoid 
repercussions.82  
 
There is a clear discrepancy between the theory and praxis 
of the Syrian regime’s laws. Five years since Decree 66 and 
Marota City were announced, alternative accommodation has 
not been provided by the state despite explicitly stating in Article 
19 of the legislation for Decree 66 that compensation for evacu-
ees will be provided. Article 45 also says that the state has up to 
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four years after the law passed to provide alternative accommo-
dation.83 In 2015, the governorate of Damascus announced the 
start of demolitions and thus the evacuation of residents which 
was done through eviction notices. The governorate stated that 
there would be monthly compensation to those that were forced 
to leave their homes, but residents claimed that there were no 
such mechanisms in place to ensure money and alternative hous-
ing would be provided. One resident commented on the lack of 
housing available, and the high rent in Damascus that they would 
not be able to afford.84 Residents are pushed out of accommoda-
tion and priced out of their own city due to what is now clearly 
emerging as state-led gentrification efforts under the cover of 
post-conflict reconstruction efforts. 
The Marota City project aims to build the largest commer-
cial mall in Syria, of 97,000 square metres.85 This project 
couldn’t have happened without the cooperation of the private 
sector, and as mentioned previously, these public-private part-
nerships solidified regime-business networks and introduced a 
new wave of Syrian businesspeople who have come from the 
diaspora as well as inside Syria. Samer Foz, a name that has been 
mentioned a lot nowadays with regards to Syria’s reconstruction, 
is helping in the development of the Basateen al-Razi area of 
Mezzeh. Foz is head of the Amman Damascus Joint Stock Com-
pany Group and son of a former member of the Ba’ath Party who 
was close to Hafez al-Assad.86 Samer Foz, hailing from Latakia, 
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is a Sunni businessman and is connected to the regime because 
of their shared desire for profit under the war economy and the 
general interest in the economic growth of Syria87. This crony-
ism transcends sect and ethnicity, and despite the fact that this 
might show that sectarianism is not an issue, this is only the case 
for the Syrian elite. On the ground, these alliances made between 
businesspeople and the regime have class-based ramifications 
that only work to strengthen the identity-based tensions that pull 
on historical grievances in the country.  
Further laws were implemented that encouraged private 
sector engagement whilst still working to retain regime control 
over their actions. Via a loophole, Decree 19 of 2015 allows the 
privatization of local administrative unit’s subsidiaries, giving 
private holding companies control and management over assets 
and properties owned by municipalities across the country.88 In 
October 2016, 25,000 people had subscribed to buy property in 
the Marota City Project and by the end of 2016, the state owned 
Commercial Bank of Syria had approved a loan request by the 
Damascus Governorate of 40 million US dollars for infrastruc-
ture works that would go towards Marota City.89 This was the 
largest loan given out since 2011. The regime even retracted 
their building restrictions on the construction of skyscrapers in 
Damascus in order to put up high rise towers in the Marota City 
project.90 These changes show the importance placed on these 
urban redevelopment projects and the vision of an upgraded, 
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wealthy and prosperous Syria that is exemplified through sky-
scrapers and Gulf-esque design features.  
Accompanying Decree 66 was Decree 63 of 2012 which en-
abled the confiscation of ‘assets and property of people who fall 
under the Counterterrorism Law of 2012’, which are then handed 
over to the state.91 Implementing this law in 2012 at the onset of 
the civil war, when there were people rallying against the state, 
was an intentional attempt to define citizenship in Syria based 
on political affiliation and has been part of the wider regime nar-
rative in Syria since the beginning of the civil war.  
As the civil war has progressed, and 2017 to 2018 has wit-
nessed the winding down of conflict due to the total destruction 
and control by the Syrian regime of opposition held areas, for-
eign investors, particularly Eastern powers such as China, India 
and Iran have been engaging in state-led investment forums and 
reconstruction events.92 These investors are interested in contrib-
uting towards luxury property projects such as Marota City, and 
the new Basilia City project .  
It has been reported that those who fled rebel held areas al-
most always are denied permits, and it provides the opportunity 
for landlords to extort those IDPs who are at their most vulnera-
ble and would pay however much it costs for a permit to move 
to a conflict-free neighbourhood.93 The securitization of neigh-
bourhoods and labelling of residents as dangerous or hostile was 
more explicit during the civil war, and it highlights the problems 
that could arise if money and resources are provided to the re-
gime for post-conflict reconstruction efforts in this current state. 
With a population dispersed, and with some legally prevented 
from getting back to their property, or physically unable to do so 
due to demolitions, there is a concerted effort to reconstruct 
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Syria anew, and in a way that will prevent the social healing of 
war-torn communities by neglecting the primary housing con-
cerns of some of the country’s most disenfranchised citizens. In-
stead, there is a focus on rebuilding Syria’s global image through 
processes of gentrification focused on big cities that will pick up 
where the state left off in the early 2000s with private foreign 
investors and construction companies.  
The regime’s demolitions took place in strategic locations 
which emphasized the importance they placed on protecting per-
ceived threats to sites of power and representations of foreign 
allies of the Syrian regime such as Iran. Geography and urban 
planning do play a role in suppressing, subduing and sometimes 
exacerbating grievances/the potential to revolt, and by recogniz-
ing where one’s unruly or disobedient citizens reside, a state 
could manipulate space to be conducive to their own political 
survival. Of course, what is most important is what is happening 
on the ground, and one resident described the Marota Project as 
just ‘a hole in the ground’.94 It is clear that Decree 66 and Law 
No. 10 are not sustainable urban development plans for the re-
gime in the long-term for a country like Syria and for the eco-
nomic crisis they are currently in, but this uneven geographical 
development will continue to encourage the segregation and hi-
erarchies exemplified in Syria’s urban planning strategies before 
and during the civil war if not addressed. The table below sum-
marizes the relevant laws that have affected urban development. 
 
                                                     
94 Interview, December 2018.  
Name of 
Law 
Year Summary 
Decree No. 
96  
1974 Urban development and cooperative housing 
law. Intention of expropriating land to build co-
operative housing societies under regulation of 
local authorities. 
Law No. 60 1979 Another law related to the urban expansion of 
real estate with explicit reference to Damascus.  
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Future reconstruction efforts 
The destruction of peoples’ homes, and the introduction of laws 
that confiscate or place further restrictions on reclaiming prop-
erty, raises concerns about the intention of the regime in facili-
tating easy return for those that have been most affected by the 
violence of the last 7 years. Only recently, Palestinian refugees 
from Yarmouk Camp were denied re-entry by security forces de-
spite the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mikdad notify-
ing Palestinian groups in Damascus that they could return. The 
Aleppo Project carried out a poll through the Chattak Conflict 
Law No. 10 1991 Allowed Syrian, Arab or foreign investors to 
launch private or mixed projects in any aspect 
of the Syrian economy. 
Law No. 26 2000 Urban development law, ‘loosening of man-
date’ of Law 60 of 1979. Intended to give local 
municipalities more flexibility to re zone infor-
mal areas. 
Law No. 1 2003 Illegal housing law. Larger fines and jail for il-
legal builders and local officials responsible. 
Law No. 46 2004 Illegal housing law. Facilitates granting a title 
to informal housing already built. Requires pub-
lic bodies to supply water and electricity.  
Law No. 33 2008 Formalization of informal settlement areas 
through a fee to local authorities. 
Law No. 59 2008 Elimination and eviction of illegal houses – 
sometimes by force.  
Decree No. 
63 
2012 Counterterrorism law. Confiscation of property 
of those deemed terrorists. 
Decree No. 
66 
2012 Urban planning law. Demolition and “re-zon-
ing” of the areas of South West Damascus 
Decree No. 
19 
2015 Privatization of local administrative units, in-
creasing private holding companies control and 
management over municipalities’ assets. 
Law No. 10 2018 Any illegal or unregistered property to be de-
molished unless property documentation is pro-
vided within a year. 
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Centre asking refugees about their prospects for return and half 
of the participants had ‘lost hope in recovering their property’. 95 
Learning from previous conflict scenarios and their reconstruc-
tion efforts will be vital to ensure that Syria will not replicate the 
mistakes of its past.  
Common understandings of states in conflict zones assume 
their control weakens and they turn into a ‘fragile’ state. But one 
understanding of the Syrian state apparatus is that it is more of a 
‘fierce’ as opposed to a ‘fragile’ state, and as a result there needs 
to be an alternative framework for thinking about reconstruction 
efforts.96 Steve Heydemann claims that if the United States, Eu-
ropean Union and the international community as a whole con-
tinue to use this ‘fragility-based model’ to provide development 
aid to Syria, the same conditions and structures will be built be-
cause ultimately one is still working with an authoritarian re-
gime.97 In the section above, we can already see qualities of 
distrust, suspicion and fear that pervaded Syrian civil society be-
fore the war, and are now manifesting as the state begins to re-
generate areas. Heydemann insists that reconstruction aid should 
not intend to bring Syria back in time to a place where it was 
once stable or normal. Reconstruction aid should intend to move 
Syria forward and beyond what it once was, and this requires 
creative thinking that involves a change to tried and tested de-
velopment processes which should include discussions on inno-
vative architecture and urban planning. A few overarching 
points will be raised below using examples from Lebanon and 
the Balkans to show where reconstruction efforts worked and 
didn’t work so well.   
 
Re-politicizing reconstruction efforts – right of return 
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Despite Russian calls to de-politicize reconstruction, this simply 
is not possible if the only conduit through which reconstruction 
aid can be delivered is through the current regime. It is necessary 
to understand the actors one is working with in order to under-
stand the feasibility of successful, inclusive reconstruction ef-
forts. It has been reported that the humanitarian aid administered 
by the United Nations was totally controlled by the Syrian re-
gime.98 Is it right for the international community to go through 
the motions of administering aid money when there is no guar-
antee that a durable political transition will be in place to accom-
pany the physical reconstruction of the country? How can 
political biases be avoided and how can one be sure that the gen-
trification of Damascus will at the minimum be accompanied by 
primary housing needs for the less well off in the capital city? 
One issue that Syrian activists, organisers and researchers 
have emphasised that is tied to reconstruction efforts is the abil-
ity for displaced Syrians to return to their cities.99 There are lo-
gistical issues to returning, and also the climate of fear and lack 
of trust that surrounds return to Syria – how much has the polit-
ical context really changed?  
 
Centring local participation 
In Sarajevo, similar projects took place to what is happening in 
Damascus; that of large scale commercial malls that lack real 
human interaction or a link to the history and traditions of the 
area. 88% of the population in Sarajevo wanted to support better 
inter-ethnic relations but the physical construction of the city 
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wasn’t enough to help citizens overcome the traumas of war.100 
With physical reconstruction came new narratives of the city and 
its people, a new future was being written that did not necessarily 
align with the aspirations of the citizens or give them enough 
time to recover from the trauma of the war and there is the po-
tential for this to happen in Aleppo and Syria as a whole. Aleppo 
is historically a trading city, it has a tradition of merchants, local 
businesses and each neighbourhood has its own idiosyncrasies 
that are tied to patterns of migration, demographic make-up and 
levels of wealth. An attempt to homogenize neighbourhoods and 
cities along these commercialized and explicitly neoliberal ge-
ographies and architectures can present serious obstacles to 
those who wish to return to their homes and recover from nearly 
a decade of turmoil.  
One way in which to ensure these local histories and geog-
raphies are not re-written is to encourage local participation in 
reconstruction efforts. The Aleppo Project’s polling also found 
that 150 of the refugees that were polled placed an emphasis on 
civil society and local participation in reconstruction efforts.101 
Local participation is something that has been emphasised across 
conflicts in order to enable the reconstruction of urban environ-
ments that fit the requirements, needs and prospects for future 
social cohesion of the local populations. The inclusion of resi-
dents will also work to rebuild trust that either did not exist or 
was lost during the violence.  
 
The role of women in Syrian civil society 
In addition to the need for more local inclusion, particular atten-
tion needs to be given to the role of women in Syrian civil and 
political society. Older men in the family are usually the people 
whose name is on property documentation, and this leaves 
women at a disadvantage when it comes to moments of crisis 
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and conflict particularly when the men in the family are either 
fighting or have ended up being killed. In a survey for the 2018 
Humanitarian Needs Overview, over half of the women who had 
documents for their property said they were issued in the names 
of their older male relatives.102 A 2015 report from the Tahrir 
Institute for Middle East Policy stated that between 12-17% of 
households in Syria were headed by women. That has risen from 
4.4% in 2009 to 22.4% in 2017. Women are now making up the 
majority of certain workforces, with 90% of the agricultural 
workforce being women.103 Despite laws in place since 1949 
claiming equality in women’s rights, cultural and religious ob-
stacles have impeded this, and Syrian women need their legal 
rights now more than ever as well as the opportunities to play 
meaningful and non-tokenistic roles in post-conflict reconcilia-
tion in Syria. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1325 on women’s participation in security and peacebuilding 
measures also supports this recognition of a dire absence in 
women’s voices in conflict-resolution.104 
 
Conclusion 
The Syrian Civil War has brought out the worst of identity-based 
grievances that existed in the country since the beginning of the 
Ba’athist era. Despite this paper showing that there was no clear 
urban development strategy before the civil war, as highlighted 
through the erratic land and housing strategies, it is difficult to 
ignore the regime’s attempt to quell opposition and secure polit-
ical loyalties through interacting with informal housing – 
whether it was by destruction or criminalization or neglect. Ul-
timately, there still is no urban development strategy to this day, 
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and this is the core of the problem. Urban development has been 
a confused act of firefighting to ensure political stability and sup-
port. If it was necessary to appease certain identity-based com-
munities over others, this would be done to ensure the status quo 
persisted. If this lack of strategy persists post-conflict, the state 
will be reproducing the same problems that led to the housing 
crisis and violence in the first place and will increase the lack of 
trust amongst the population’s varied communities.  
Identity has always been utilized by the Syrian state in an 
effort to maintain power, but it was used fluidly – as is the nature 
of identity. As shown in the historical analyses, sect and ethnic-
ity were at one point a way to ascertain whether someone was 
politically loyal. Class and economic status were also used to 
encourage a more stimulated private sector. These identities 
sometimes overlapped, and ethnic groups were prioritized and 
given economic benefits – job opportunities, better housing, eas-
ier access to cities – and as a result they climbed the socio-eco-
nomic ladder. This paper is not suggesting sectarianized 
identities and their grievances should be the primary lens to un-
derstand the civil war, but it is an important piece of the story. 
The civil war dynamic exposed the fractures in Syria’s so-
ciety and with it, it is possible to understand some of the griev-
ances the population held, particularly relating to the country’s 
housing crisis. 2,280 communities out of the 4,006 communities 
that were surveyed for the 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview 
said that housing was an issue of concern.105 It is clear that in 
any post-conflict scenario that has witnessed large scale demoli-
tion, housing is going to be a concern. But what is even more of 
a concern is when the government of the day is facilitating a 
problematic transition into peacetime that does not place primary 
housing – especially for working class citizens that had clear po-
litical grievances - as a priority.  
This analysis of the regime’s use of urban development as 
a way to consolidate political loyalties is important to understand 
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because of the reconstruction efforts and discussion of recon-
struction aid taking place in the political discourse on the Syrian 
Civil War today. How this reconstruction aid is distributed, how 
it manifests in terms of the architectural design and urban plan-
ning of Syrian cities and to who it is administered to, are all vital 
questions to ask in order to ensure Syria is not going to be re-
peating the same mistakes of the Balkans, Lebanon or Northern 
Ireland.  
All evidence points towards the fact that reconstruction aid 
should not be channelled through the regime alone as it currently 
stands unless there is a clear commitment to facilitating the re-
turn of Syrian refugees and a political transition that is inclusive 
of local community groups and that will allow meaningful input 
into the reconstruction of Syria’s cities. Identity-based tensions 
have been exacerbated by the regime’s ghettoization of commu-
nities into informal neighbourhoods, and the continued planning 
and construction of Marota and Basilia Cities does not bode well 
for a future projection of Syria that is inclusive, democratic and 
socially egalitarian. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
